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Christian National Education has been influential in shaping official 
education policy in South Africa. Though Fundamental Pedagogics has dis­
tinguished itself from Christian National Education by claiming to be a 
"science" of education, not tied to any particular philosophy of life, 
this report tiies to show it has developed from Christian National Edu­
cation and has extremely close affinities with it.
From a perspective that emphasises individual autonomy and respect" for 
persons, this report develops a critique of the notion of "authority" in 
Christian National Education and Fundamental Pedagogics. It examines the 
assumptions underlying these notions of authority, showing how they as­
sume as "natural" certain political, economic and social relations, and 
endorse social inequity. Finally suggestions are offered towards formu­
lating principles of "authority" which might allow for autonomy and give 
recognition to individual worth.
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The Shorter Oxford Dictionary's definitions of "authority" include :
1.The power or right to enforce obedience
2.Moral or legal supremacy
3.Power to influence conduct
4.Title to be believed
5.An expert in any question.
Legal definitions in the Oxford Companion to Law include :
1. Power conferred by law
2. Legal power to do acts of a particular kind.
3. Person or body having legal power in a particular sphere
These definitions do not exclude other uses, but there is a strong link 
between "authority" and "power". Power, provided it is legitimate, is 
sometimes regarded as "authority". Christian National Education (CNE) and 
Fundamental Pedagogics (FP) share this notion of "authority" but philo­
sophically there is a crucial distinction between "power", even legiti­
mate "power", and "authority". This distinction is equally crucial in the 
understanding of "authority" in education.
CNE has influenced educational policy in South Africa, and I intend to 
show some extent of its influence, and to show that FP and CNE are very 
closely linked. 1 propose to develop a critique of their notion of "au­
thority" and its relations with other notions such as "freedom". The 
conscious and articulated purposes do not sufficiently explain the role 
of "authority" in CNE and FP in South African political and economic af­
fairs. I plan to investigate this and finally to make some suggestions
towards establishing more equitable principles for "authority" in educa­
tion in South Africa.
Any proposals about education are based on what is considered worthwhile 
about the good life life. In Section Five, I intend tc explain in a little 
more detail my view of the good life, but initially I want to state that 
my critique of "authority" in CNF. and FP is dev loped from a viewpoint 
that stresses the autonomy of thd individual, and the ethical principle
of respect for each individual as a person.
Notes:
1.Unless otherwise indicated, emphases are part of the original quotations.
2.Both CNE and FP appear to consider that only males are involved in education 
The pronoun "he" is invariably used. I have tried to use neutral terms, but 
this has not always been possible.
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SECTION ONE
THE INFLUENCE OF C H R IS T IA N  N A T IO N A L  ED U C A TIO N  ON SOUTH  
A FR IC A N  ED UCA TIO N
It in difficult to spoflk with "any absolute authority about influences 
which may or may not be at work within the processes which may ultimately
it B,
lead to statements of policy. (1) In spite of this difficulty, though, 
there are some indicators that point, to the factors that contribute to­
wards the formulation of policy and legislation in education in South 
Africa on one hand and statements of theory on the other
The influence of CNE cannot be precisely measured, but similarities be­
tween CNF. policy and the wording and substance of South African education 
legislation give some idea of its influence. In addition, many writers 
seem to shave the assumption that CNF. policy has already been implemented 
in the South African education system.
CNE derives from an interpretation of Calvinism, not necessarily as in­
terpreted elsewhere, but a South African form of Calvinism that seenw. to 
accommodate South Africa's racial policies. I do not intend to discuss 
the relations between South African and other versions of Calvinism, al­
though it could be mentioned that a common feature of all Calvinism, and 
CNE, was a close union between the the church and the stair, and for 
practical purposes "all schooling was to be regarded as church 
schooling."(2) The South African version of CNE was formulated by a com­
mit tee of prominent Afrikaners, the ICNO (Die Instituut vir Christelike- 
Nasionale Onderwys) of the FAX (Fedorasie van Afrikcanse 
Kultuurvoreniylnge). This committee, the ICNO, published in 1948 the 
Christeliko Nasionale Ondorwysboleid.(3) This will be referred to as the 
Belaid or Policy.
On 17 November 1948, the congress of the National Party adopted a resol­
ution that the country's education policy should conform to the FAX s 
Version of CNE. As the National Party was. bv this time, the ruling 
party, this resolution could be considered to have become government 
policy. In the face of protest, the policy was not overtly applied in 
White education, but aspects of the policy, it has been argued, can Id 
recognised in the Bantu Education Act and the educational legislation of 
the 1960's.(4)
Articles 14 and 15 of the Policy deal with "Coloured" and "Bantu" educa­
tion. Article 14, referring to "Coloured" education, states "We believe' 
the Coloured "can be made made race conscious if the principle of race 
segregation is strictly applied in education."(5) Article 15 emphasises 
"the principle of trusteeship, no equality and segregation." The princi­
ples in those articles are echoed in the Bantu Education Act. Echoes of 
the Bnleid are also hoard in the Eiselon Commission which preceded the 
Bantu Education Act. The commission recommended that
(a) Education must be broadly conceived so that it can be 
organised effectively to provide not only schools with a 
Christian character but also social institutions to har­
monise with such schools of Christian orientation.(6)
This is compatible with one of the main professed ideas of CNE. which 
intends to propagate Christian values and to Christiwnlso the "Coloured"
and "Bantu". The influence of CNF. is also evident in the Education Policy 
Act of 1967 (Act 39 of 1967), which "made clear reference to the Cht istlan
and National character that was to permeate South African education "(7)
Other pointers to the assumption that CNE has been implemented in South 
African education was an article in the "Transvalor" of November, 1967, 
which stated that "without the application of the system of Christian 
National Education, the political history of South Africa ovar the last 
30 or 40 years ould have he en entirely different."(8) The Breeder bond 
also had among its aims the implementation of CNL in South African edu­
cation. The FAX, which formulated the CNF. Beloid, was a front of the 
Broedcrbond, and affiliated to it wore "church organisations, women's 
associations, students' and youth organisations."(9) It made every at­
tempt to apply CNE and its task was facilitated by the fact that every 
prime minister since 1948 has been a member of the organisation. In 1968, 
A. Treurnicht was able to assert that "...our Government placed a law of 
Christian National education on the statute book last year."(10)
It is clear that CNF. has been of crucial importance in influencing South 
African education policy, but there was always resistance to CNE and the 
changing situation in South Africa led to an adaptation and refining of 
many of the government's policies end practices. I do not claim that FP 
was a conscious adaptation, or part of a conspiracy, but I feel that by 
claiming to be a value free, "science" of education, it has served to make 
CNF. more palatable, and will argue this claim in Section Two.
THE LINKS BETWEEN C . IR IS T IA N  N A T IO N A L  E D U C A TIO N  AND KUNDA- 
M ENTAL PEDAGOGICS
Christian National Education was a theory of education designed accord'ng 
to Calvinist Afrikaner beliefs. It was part of the Afrikaner's struggle 
to achieve control of education. Fundamental Pedagogics claims to be a 
value-free, neutral "science" of education and asserts that it is the only 
method which can lead to a true understanding of education. On the sur­
face, the two doctrines appear to be completely different. CNE is explicit 
about its values. "For the Calvinist, ths aim of education is associated 
with the purpose ordained by God.'(l) FP, on the other hand, claims to 
be a "scitnce dealing with education."(2) The pndagogiclan is expected 
to confine himself strictly to "unprejudiced descriptions and therefore 
must avoid all apparent arbitrary platitudes,...speculative talk and un­
verified Judgements."(3) FP and CNE would seem to be completely incom­
patible. "Christian Education as a science is a contradiction in 
terms."(4) Hit FP is a more sophisticated version of CNE. CNF. had long
uuon the focus of considerable resistance, and particularly by being as­
sociated with the hat<d "Bantu Education" had been completely rejected
by other groups. It was claimed that CNE had been "developed by Dutch
Reformed A.'ikanors for the education of Dutch Reformed children (not for 
the education of other groups)."(S) Yet even in the Beleid, CNE prescribe*, 
education for other race groups. The resistance against CNE shbwed the 
need for a theory that was easier to defend, and FP as a theory was more 
marketable than CNE. 1 do not intend to suggest it was deliberately de­
signed to deceive, but was certainly more defensible. It has a distinction 
between theory and practice; it can propagate a theory that is universal, 
yet allow for a particular practice and a ommodate, virtually intact, 
the divided South African education system. FP replaced CNE as a theory 
in many institutions, but close affinities between the two remained. 
"Philosophy of education in South Africa has moved in the space of a few 
years from pre-occupation with a system of values as stated essentially 
in the CNE Policy of 1948 to an attempt to approach education from a 
'scientific' point of view."(6) At the same time, FP has been regarded
as a "philosophic red-herring which distracts attention away from the 
doctrine of CNE. (7)
By detailing some similarities, I want to show that CNE and FP are es-
sentially the same. In th' mparison, I shall use as sub-headings the 
principles that J. Chr. Coetzee describes as the principles which underlie 
CNE policy. He mentions these principles as "religious, national and 
philosophic", and describes these as forming a "unity, a three-in-one or 
a one-in three."(8) J do not accept these terms as being accurate, but 
will use them to show that both CNE and FP attach the same use and im­
portance to them.
Before any comparisons are made, one thing needs some clarification. FP 
usually counters criticism by stating that its critics have failed to 
distinguish between pre-scientific, scientific and post-scientific
phases. Pedagogiciann charge that critics ... disregard the conviction 
of these advocates that Christian National Education and Calvinism are 
post-scientific matters."(9) It becomes necessary to examine these dis­
tinctions. Du Plooy and Kilian (10) describe these distinctions; Pre- 
scientific knowledge is "unsystematised, unreliable, uncontrolled.
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subjective, inaccurate .0 im perfect. It is part of the life-world, the 
point of departure for practising science. Scientific knowledge is un­
prejudiced of nature, supplemented by the findings of other scientists, 
rationally or intellectually obtained, accounted for, acquired in a me­
thodical way, generally accepted as being valid, communicable and 
intelligible." When scientific knowledge is applied, when it is used as 
the method, but the life-views of a particular group are propagated, this 
becomes the post-scientific phase. The distinction seems very straight­
forward, and nothing is considered to be problematic. It assumes that 
"facts" are "facts" and indisputable and that a very clear distinction 
exists between facts and values, theory and practice. FP ignores a .hole 
area of disagreement the idea that facts are bound up with some concept 
of rationality. Many argue that rationality is not universal, and "dif­
ferent groups and cultures order their experience by means of different 
concepts. Schemes of concepts provide grids on which to base belief."(11) 
To some extent "facta" are theory-laden and our perceptions dictate our 
"facts". A practice cannot be entirely independent of theory.
FP's distinction between the pre-scientific, fhe scientific and the post 
scientific moments presents extensive problems. The difficulties are 
compounded by FP's failure, to distinguish the phase in which particular 
statements are to be categorized. Many statements are made by 
pedagogicians as assertions of "scientific fact" but are extremely con­
tentious if viewed as such. The following is an example: "where authority 
rules there Is love and emotional security, where the course, of events 
is determined by an authority who is sympathetic, there one finds regu­
larity and courtesy...What else is discipline but the spontaneous, con­
stant and the communal readiness to answer... demands made on the 
individual and the group." (I.). This is made as a statement of "fact"
and not as any kind of theory. FP tries to say that its critics fail to 
see that some of its statements are post-scientific, but some of these 
are offered as scientific statements. To show these similarities between 
CNE and FP, I have used Coetzee1s principles as headings, as these are 
fundamental to CNF..
The Religious Principle
Article 2 of the Beleid states that "religion should determine the spirit 
and direction of...all other subjects" and "all instructions... shall be 
founded on the Christian basis of the life and world-view of our nation. " 
Coetzee affirms that "The religious basis of the C.N.E. policy then is 
the reformed Calvinistic religion...we believe and confess the self suf­
ficiency and the Absolute Sovereignty of God the Creator. . .He is the 
Creator, Ruler and Provider."(13) In FP, the need tor religion is regarded 
as essential though the form of the religion could differ. "For whether 
a person or a nation worships the Christian God or a natural 
phenomenon...his religions inspiration will dominate his 
life...determining for him, his chosen scale of values."(14) This state­
ment would indicate that FP is not bound to a particular religious belief 
but as a value-free "science" accommodates all beliefs. But this kind of 
statement is not frequently made, and more often Christian values are 
stressed. That many existential phenomenolegists are atheists does not 
present any problems to F.P. "Some existential phenomenologist are 
atheists... the God who is rejected by these atheistically orientated 
philosophers is not the Christian God...The phenomenologists conclude 
above all that man is sustained by faith."(15)
Emphasising that religion is essential in FP, Gunter(16), in describing 
"Human nature in general" maintains that "human nature will basically 
always remain the same," and that religion is an inescapable part of a 
human oeing. "Man's complete conquest of evil and his salvation from sin 
are possible only though Divine grace." There is no indication that these 
statements are "post-scientific"; they seem to be regarded as universal. 
Du Plooy and Kilian, also in FP, writing as pedagogicians (17) state as 
a "scientific fact" that the child has to "align himself to a standard 
(norm) which is accepted as correct in a small family or a large society 
and the educand's adherence to such a norm will at once indicate his 
willingness to become a proper being."
The findings of FP are remarkably similar to the views of CNF.. "... the 
Christian Pedagogician ..constantly sees the concept world as God's cre­
ation. And for the idea that the world produces man, he reads: God cre­
ates or brings man into the world in the sense that God is the being who, 
as a supporter of the world, brings forth man."(18) This view contradicts 
the notion in FP that a pedagogician must bracket his "philosophy of life" 
for the period of his scientific research.
The National Principle
Another principle stressed by Coetzee is the "national principle." The 
word "national" is given an arbitrary meaning in CNF. A nation is not 
regarded as a group sharing a geographic area, but takes into account 
colour and language, The Afrikaner are regarded as a nation. "By the 
National principle," Article 1 of the Beleid explains, "We understand love 
for everything that is our own." Article 3 expands, "...love tor one's
own may effectively become valid in the entire content of the teaching 
and all the activities of the school.11 The meaning of "national", except 
for this kind of brief description, seems to be taken as understood. "We 
accept that people differ' fundamentally in national mattjrs."(19) FP also 
assumes the meaning of "national" to be unproblematic, and its attitude 
to the "national principle" is very similar. "Today, especially when many 
thinkers are trying to efface national boundaries to establish a homoge­
neous world community (collectivism),...it is becoming even more essen­
tial to note the various national aspirations which every nation envisages 
for its children. A strong national consciousness is after all a condition 
for sound international relations."(20) "Education with a national char­
acter, like the South Africa system, wcnts to convey norms and values 
peculiar to that character. In this regard the endeavour of White South 
Africa is to preserve its identity."(21)
It is interesting to note the shifting meaning of "national". With CNE 
"national'’ was limited to "Afrikaner1’ while FP, which came after political 
dominance had oeo.n achieved, extended "national" to include all V .ites. 
It seems difficult to accept the kind of definition attributed to "na­
tional". Does it mean culture, or is colour, or language or political 
agreement the determining factor? Morrow questions this kind of defi­
nition in terms of Zulu education.(22) How does one determine a White 
nation, or for that matter any other nation in a community such as South 
Africa?
The Philosophical Principle
Coetzee uses the term "philosophical" to describe another basic principle 
of CNE. The use of the term is peculiar. It seems to have no relation to
the usually accupted use of the term. It is assigned a completely arbi- 
trary use. There seems to bo little that is "philosophical" in the "third 
very important basic principle underlying our C.N.E. Policy"(23) which 
includes the four agencies which have an interest and or a right in the 
education of the child: they are the home, the church, the state and the 
school. Article 8 of the rioleid also emphasises those agencies: "We be­
lieve the home, the school and the church are three places in which our 
nation is bred,..they must complement one another so that each gets his 
right share in the forming of the child." FP does not refer to these 
agencies as the "philosophic principle", but refers to the "interwoven 
social structures", (an echo of CNF terms) and these structures "whicn 
have a task and a responsibility in education" are "the school, the fam­
ily, the state, the church and the teaching corps."(24)
CNE describes the relation of these agencies as being equal, "We reject 
in principle any domination of our schools by the state, the church or 
the home. The C.N.E.school should he free to function within the lim*ts 
assigned to it by our principle of sovereignty in its own orbit. This 
freedom, however will not be thought of as absolute but only as relative, 
as freedom under authority. But the C.N.E. school does not exist by itself 
away from all contact with the state, church and the home... it is 
interwoven."(25) FP's view is similar. "The principle of sovereignty in 
its own sphere is seen as the norm or idea for the reciprocal coherence 
between the various social structures and educational institutions." Both 
FP and CNE have similar views about the roles of those institutions.
The Home
CNE avouches, "We believe and confess that the child is the child of the 
home and it is the interest, duty and right of the parents to educate... 
the children given to them by God...they must decide on the foundation,
aim and spirit of their children's education."(25) FP's view is similar, 
"The parents...must accept primary responsibility for the education of 
their children..they influence the underlying character of school edu­
cation to reflect their religious moral and cultural views." (26) But in 
spite of this emphasis on the importance of the home, in practice the home 
does not always have this right. The "Coloured" or "Bantu" parents do not 
have the right to determine the foundation and spirit of the education 
of their children. The power of the state overrides the wishes of the 
parents.
The State
\ .
<
The state is assigned the responsibility for organising school education. 
The Beleid declares that "the state must see to it that in school life 
law is valid and is maintained", and see to it that "scientific" teaching 
is provided (Article 8(5)). Com zee(27) argues that "the state is deeply 
concerned for its own existence and preservation in the cultivation of 
its youthful members,.. The young citizen must also receive a civic ed­
ucation and the state must take care that such training is given to the 
child, knowledge of state affairs, obedience to the state rule,etc.11 FT 
expects that "The state should see that all its citizens receive adequate 
and essential education for the existence, survival and development of 
the national community...should arrange matters such as mother-tongue 
education, compulsory subjects... according to national needs and
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the community's philosophy of life."(28)
In those "philosophical" statements, the idiosyncratic use of the term 
"philosophy" rests on controversial assumptions which go undefended. The 
state is the organised community. All the interests represented by the 
state, the conflicts and struggle for dominance are ignored. It is assumed 
that there is consensus about "national needs". There are also questions 
about expressions such as "survival and development of the national 
communlty"and "civic" education.
The N atu re  of the Child
Other suppositions are shared by CNE and FP, among these what is described 
as "the nature of the child" and views about the relationship between the 
child and the adult. Both doctrines have shared views about "the nature 
of the child." Article 4 of the Boleld:"Wo believe that through the Fall 
sir has penetrated by means of heredity to later generations and that the 
child as the object of teaching and education is therefore a sinful and 
not a sinless being... that God, cut of his grace made a contract with the 
believing general ions... therefore the act of teaching must treat a child 
of believing parents as a believe:...that in the child's condition of 
unripeness, his dependence, his ablity to learn by experience, his 
docility and his imperfection lie the possibility of all teaching and 
education." FP declares the child to be "...initially very unfinished and 
uncomplete...He comes into the world completely clumsy, unskilled, ig -  
norant, injudicious , unexperienced, incompetent, undisciplined, irre­
sponsible , and therefore very dependent. As a human child...he is 
ono-who-ought-to-be-different."(29)
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If one accepts th.it communities have the right to educate the children 
of their members in terms of theii beliefs, it could be said that sup­
porters of CNE are entitled to educate their children in terms of their 
fundamentalist Calvinist beliefs. There could be no objection if CNE were 
applied to believing children only, but it is, in spite of objections, 
applied to people with other beliefs. FP professes to be "scientifically" 
neutral, and this neutrality should ensure that there are no 
presuppositions about human nature. While Christian belief may accept 
that human nature is essentially evil because of the Fall, other religions 
do not necessarily share this view. The Islamic view is that human beings 
are born free of sin, and are accountable for their acuions only after 
puberty. The Hindu belief describes a person as being punished or rewarded 
by the form of life in the next reincarnation, but. guilt is not carried 
further. A person does not start life by being naturally sinful. These 
statements are particular views about the essential nature of humankind 
and not universally accepted. Yet they are stated as facts. "Education 
is not capable of assisting man to transcend the bounds of his 
creaturcliness, to cure him of tendency towards moral evil and to save 
him Jrom his sins. Not oven the best education in the world can change 
him as radically as this."(30) There are other assumptions in FP that are 
similar to CNF.. A human being is "by nature inclined to evil. . .Man's 
complete conquest of evil and his salvation from sin are possible only 
through Divine grace... because he has become imbued with the spirit of 
Christ."(31) "Basically man is a religious being."(32)
The pedagogician usually answers charges of propagating CNE by claiming 
that such statements are "post scientific", but these statements are not
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qualified in any way, and appear to be assertions of "facts.11 It is dif­
ficult to conceive of the "scientific" reflections that could lead to 
these "post scientific" conclusions. They are mide as "objective" state­
ments, and are not problematic in any way.
In looking at the notions of "authority" in CNE and FP, a number of other 
similarities will be evident. On the basis of what has been said though 
there is adequate Justification for the conclusion that FP is a more re-
SECTION THREE
N O TIO N S OF "A U T H O R IT Y "  IN C H R IS T IA N  N A T IO N A L  ED UCA TIO N AND
FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS
Tho Rnleid merit ions the word "authority" a few times, but there is no
_  1 r
detailed account of it. Assumption* are not explained or explored in any 
way. This is acceptable as the Be Ioid could he regarded as a statement 
uf principles, but what does appear unacceptable is that the use ot the 
term is not clear or consistent.
Article 7(1) states: "We believe all authority in school is authority 
borrowed from God and that it places great responsibilities, duties and 
rights on both the Christian teacher and the child. We believe the aim 
of all discipline should be the Christian and National formation of, 
preservation of, the child (verm Ingen behoud), the welfare of the commu­
nity, and above all the glory of God." Article 6(7) continues: "The school 
must be free to work independently and se1f-determinantly within the 
limits placed upon it. But this freedom must not be thought to be rev­
olutionary; it must he freedom under authority...the state as the au­
thority for legally obtaining financial means must take upon itself the 
chief part in defraying the school expenses. The control of the school 
must in the first place be in the hands of the parents.M
In these two articles tho term "authority " could moan legal entitlement 
or right, power to correct and discipline, suppression by a higher power, 
0Jlly appointed agent, controlling power. In these sections of the 
Beleid there is a conflation of meanings and there is no attempt to dia-
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criminate in any way regarding the different meanings of the term. 
Gluckman (1) describes Coetz.ee as summing up CNE's idea of authority as
a) God is the absolute authority to whom man owes total 
ob.dl.nc.
b) God has delegated his authority to man
c) Children must obey their patents, their teachers and all 
others with authority o'er them but only in the Lord.
"God has given Man a written Law which teaches him to practise only what 
is pleasing to God...most important of all...obedience. The fifth 
Commandment enjoins us to honour our father and mother and this is ex­
tended to mean we should honour and obey "those whom God has exalted to 
any authority over them, and render them honour, obedience and gratitude."
"Authority" in the sense of compulsion is also implied in some of the 
terras used in the Be'^id, such as "should" and "must".These are frequently 
used and, by implication, are not suggestions but Imperatives. The fol­
lowing are some of the term# used (emphases are mine):
Artic le  1 "We believe that teaching and education of the children of white 
parents should occur ... We believe the principles must both become fully 
valid in the teaching and education of our children... National princi­
ples must be under the guidance of the of Christian National principle - 
the National principle must grow from the Christian root..."
A rtic le  2 "We believe religious instruction should be the key subject in 
school. It must determine the spirit and direction of all their 
subjects... It must not merely be a knowledge of the subject."
These examples are from the first two articles only, and the terms are 
used frequently throughout the Beleid. Implicitly, the Beleid becomes 
the authority, and tries to apply a form of moral compulsion. Wilson(2) 
concludes that "a moral decision must derive ultimately from the interest 
which one finds in trying to live according to it... In the case of 
schooling, then, compulsion is no less moral, than the schooling itself." 
The moral compulsion nf CNK would be justified if everyone shared an in­
terest in CNE, but if the values are rejected, then it would be difficult 
to justify compulsion.
"Authority" in CNE seems to emphasise the idea of control and p'wer, but,
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as stated, the uses of the term are not explored. In FP "authority" is 
considered as an essential educational category, but though its necessity 
is repeatedly stressed, its uses are not regarded as problematic in any 
way.
In writing about "authority" the question of sources needs to be men­
tioned. In CNE, the Beleid is obviously a prime source. The explanations 
of Prof. J Chr. Coetzee, an authority on the Beleid, can be regarded as 
authoritative. I have also used the University of South Africa's study 
guides in use before the introduction of FP. A good argument can be made 
that the guides are explaining CNE notions. FP has no such single source 
as the Beleid and among FP writers there are differences, but these are 
generally minor differences. Most of the writers I have referred to are 
usually quoted extensively in FP writings.
To bring about some degree of clarity I have grouped notions of "author­
ity" under subheadings. At the same times these subheadings make simi-
CNE is based on a particular religious belief, and the source of its au­
thority is the Reformed Calvinistic religion. This is a version of 
Calvinism as interpreted by Afrikaner theologians, and includes certain 
views on race which do not seem to be part of original Calvinism. It. also 
stresses fundamental acceptance by faith of the bible as authority for 
the way of life to be adopted by the Afrikaner. It also "highlights 
election and predestination and...stresses the concept of original 
sin...and discipline, narrowly conceived as an essential and basic means 
of education."(3) In FP, authority is a basic educational category. 
"Without the exercise of authority, an educational situation does not come 
into being. "(4) Authority, in FP, is the "conditio sine qua non of edu­
cation. Without authority, i.e. without the exercise of authority, (i.e. 
discipline) in one way or another on the part of the adult for the good 
of the ndult-in-the-making...and the acceptance of and obedience to au­
thority by the latter... an educational situation, an educational action 
and education as a consequence are impossible and • hinkable."(5)
There is a good example of the kind of conflation of notions prevalent 
in FP. Authority is regarded as essential, as a "conditio sine qua non", 
but authority is then equated with the "exercise of authority", which is 
then equated with "discipline." All these notions are not the same. "Au­
thority" is a complex notion and should be recognised as clearly distinct 
from "discipline". "Authority" is part of a rule-governed way of acting. 
Winch(6) feels that a relation of authority is an indirect relation be­
tween two persons with an established way as an intermediary. This implies
that there is a right and wrong way, and this creates the need for "au­
thority". When there is doubt or difference, authority is needed to point 
the right way. Where agreement to establish what is right is lacking, then 
someone is in authority to decide what is right. Authority may also es­
tablish who the person is who must decide. To decide what is correct one 
depends on a tradition, a special relation to an established way. CNE and 
FP have different views about the not ion of authority. Authority seems 
to be a kind of power vested in a person or institution. In CNE there is 
very little examination of the notion itself, and there is much greater 
emphasis on its uses as power or control. Du Plooy and Kilian(7) explain 
the FP view of authority as coming from "auctor"(Latin) and means origi­
nator, causer or doer; a writer or an author. Auctoritas (Latin) has 
amongst others, the meaning of authorisation, full power, authority, an 
inr ntial person even security. Augeo (Latin infinitive augere) can 
mean to strengthen, to enrich, to help to protect, to guide, to encourage. 
The basic constituents of authority are listed as "allowing to be told, 
to be addressed, to be charged (or called upon), obedience, acknowledging 
authority, living up, to authority, subjecting fone'sself) to the au­
thority of norms." The writers specifically exclude as a sterile 
connotation force, suppression or punishment, yet all these constituents 
stress the idea of being obedient or controlled and except for "norms" 
does not consider the idea of following rules. Peters(8) also refers to 
authority as being derived from "auctor" and "auctoritas" c.ud quotes Lewis 
and Short to the effect that the auctor brings about the existence of any 
object or promotes the increase or prosperity of it, whether he originates 
it or gives it greater continuance or prominence. Auctoritas, a produc­
ing, invention or cause can be exorcised in opinion, counsel or command, 
but Peters stresses that while this explains the philology, all authority 
cannot be adequately conceived in this fashion. As Winch does, Peters also
soes authority as part of a rule-governed way of doing something. Au­
thority presupposes following a rule, an appeal to an impersonal normative 
order or value system.
Winch says of authority that it is "intimately connected with some of the 
most central issues in philosophy."(9) But KP does not offer any real kind 
of clarification of it, and nne is not clear about any assumed differences 
between authority and other notions, such as power, control and punish­
ment .
The Need for A u th o rity  and its Im portance
CNE regards authority as essential because its religious belief describes 
human nature as being corrupt in its entirety. "Man's predilection for 
evil permeates his whole being."(10) Human beings can never rid themselves 
of thia inborn predisposition to evil. Education can mitigate this evil 
but not eradicate it. The grace of God is required for education to be 
efficacious, and this grace can only be obtained by a "glorification of 
God through positive obedient relationship with Him."(11) The Fifth 
Commandment enjoins us to honour our father and mother, and CNE extends 
this to include the idea that we should honour and obey "those whom God 
had exalt'd to any authority over them and should render them honour, 
obedience and gratitude."(12) CNE demands submission to those in author­
ity on the basis that God has appointed them to positions of authority 
but obedience must bo "in the Lord" which is interpreted to mean that 
submission to earthly authorities is only a step towards honouring the 
Supreme Authority.(13) This idea of authority makes obedience a funda­
mental part of education. CNE is quite emphatic about obedience. The in­
vocation of the Fifth Commandment makes obedience a matter, not of 
educational utility, but a religious action.
Submission to authority is regarded as an aim of education.(14) This ap­
pears to give education a very unusual aim. An argument could possibly 
be made for the need for obedience to someone in authority so that the
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nece ssa ry order among, or even docility of. the pupils would permit the 
achievement of other aims, but to regard authority as an aim suggests that
education must inculcate an attitude that makes pupils submissive and 
encourages the acceptance of authority. With the notion that obedience 
must he in the Lord, obedience becomes an act of worship or piety. While 
all these notions are not uncomplicated, "schooling" which has some 
connotations of training could possibly accommodate "submissiveness" but 
education implies, even if only to a limited extent, the idea of some 
independent thought; and unquestioning obedience and ’education" would 
be a contradiction.
The notion of obedience as an act of worship is not consistently stated 
in CNE but this opinion is held by Van Vuuron, whose view is that "the 
central problem of all education is the relationship between the use of 
freedom and authority in education."(15) This Importance, it ia ex­
plained, is "because freedom (to make responsible choices which reflect 
character) is the aim of education, whilst authority and discipline are 
aids to the attainment of the ideal."(16) This link between authority and 
discipline is quite revealing. "Authority" seems to be the exertion of 
one will over another, and discipline is conceived, quite wrongly I think, 
as control.The association of authority and freedom is not simple, and 
needs further examination.
In FP, too, the need for authority appears to rest on what is perceived 
to be the nature of the child. The child is regarded as being- in-neod. 
It is helpless and in need of support, a dependant, ignorant and inexpe­
rienced being who wants to "become self-reliant himself, is in urgent need 
and asks for assistance, support and guidance."(17) The helplessness or 
imperfection of the child is a recurring thought. The child is "at first 
unable to fend for himself and therefore very dependant, clumsy, un­
skilled, ignorant, injudicious, unexperienced, incapable, undisciplined, 
irresponsible, etc."(18) But with all these imperfections, the child has 
an innate desire for someone to control it, or according to FP, for au­
thority. There is an instinctive need for guidance and an unconscious cry 
for assistance. "The newborn child is...cast adrift in this world; he is 
uncertain, seeks stability...can be rescued...because of his wanting 
help. Because he feels this is so. "(19) FP considers that there is more 
in the nature of the child than the search for stability. There is a na­
tural search for "authority". "Fortunately the child is a being who seeks 
authority."(20) Authority also becomes imperative because of some inborn 
qualities. "He is by nature inclined to evil and finds it easier to follow 
the broad way of evil rather than the sleep narrow way to goodness."(21) 
In FP, a pedagogic!an as a practitioner of the "science" of education 
is required to reflect on the phenomenon of education and discover its 
essence. These statements about the child's need for "authority" are made 
as if they wore part of the essence. One can accept that the child is 
helpless at birth, but that a child seeks assistance and authority and 
that a child is by nature inclined to evil, are, to say the least, ques­
tionable assumptions. Yet these statements are made as if they are em­
pirical, though no substantial ion is offered. The contribution of social 
factors towards shaping behaviour and attitudes is ignored and the child 
is assumed to exist in a sort of social vacuum. The nature of the au­
thority sought by the child is unclear, but from the context, a form of 
control is implied. In FP, education seems possible only if there is 
coercion, overt if necessary but better if it is covert. "The lower or 
initial limit of education coincides with the stage in a child's life when 
one can rightly speak of his acceptance and obedience to authority."(22) 
There is only occasionally an attempt to examine uses or the notion it­
self. One such brief attempt to examine meanings is Guntor's(23) de­
scription of "authority" being "internal" or "external". "Internal 
authority" .’s the authority as an expert, as '"one who knows". The educator 
commands greater knowledge and represents what is good and to be achieved. 
Different from this is external authority, which is Justified because the 
educator is a surrogate parent and a representative of the organised 
community. Gunter adds that in a Christian community, the educator re­
ceives his vocation and task via the parents from God, to Whom he is re­
sponsible and from Whcm he holds his mandate. Gunter also describes 
external authority as something that "compels obedience". Though Gunter 
analyses the meanings ascribed to authority, the analysis is very limited, 
and external authority can best be described as an exercise in power. The 
person in power, or the person in authority, seems to bo infallible, and 
any questioning appears to be an act of serious disobedience. The teacher 
may be "the expert" but even an expert is fallible, and particularly in 
education, questioning and doubt should not bo excluded.
Authority as Expertise
Both CNE and FP consider the person vested with authority to have power 
and to bo an expert. In CNE, the school is a formal, specialist institu­
tion for the teaching of the child, which must decide on methods and 
procedures(24) but the Beleid also insists that the teacher must be "a
man of Christian life ana world view without which he is a deadly 
danger."(Article 9) Although teachers are expected to bo trained in the 
"pedagogic sciences", and the school is assumed to have the expertise to 
provide proper education, the skill is subject to the Christian life and 
world view. Education is divided into "three things, a process, an 
educand, the aim."(25) The process involves teaching which must be of a 
"good scientific standard."(Article 8:5) Thus, even in CNE, there is an 
indication that education is "scientific" and the teacher is an expert 
in the process of education.
While CNE states it indirectly, it is fundamental to FP that education 
is a "science". Guntcr(26) explains that one of the bases cf the authority 
of the adult is "his authority as an export" because he commands far more 
knowledge and wisdom, and he represents a specific selection of what is 
good. His "internal authority or authority of expertise...impels volun­
tary obedience."(26) Gunter is emphatic that the bearer of authority 
possesses a larger share of spiritual values. "The child has to accept 
the expertise of the adult, that the adult's knowledge exceeds the 
cnild's. If the child acknowledges the authority of the educator, the 
child becomes "a privileged child who knows what he does not know in this 
wide vast world will be made known to him."(27). This is because "The 
educators in the education or pedagogic situation are experienced men or 
women "(28) It is axiomatic in FP that the adult is mature, "...the adult 
who knows, can and is what the child as yet does not know, cannot and is 
not. "(29) The expertise of the adult (or the teacher, the two are often 
synonymous) apart from any specialised knowledge of subject-matter and 
methodology, includes a knowledge and understanding of the world, 
"...comprehension of the world and life in general, the person's grasp
The child cannot acquire an understanding of the world on its own, it is 
dependant on tha adult for an understanding of the world. The child needs 
the support of an adult to make responsible choices because "without help 
the child cannot grasp the moaning of life."(10) The adult is "<i person 
who has knowledge (understanding) of norms and values."(31) Knowledge and 
mastery of subject-matter aie not the complete grounds for authority, but 
are more in the nature of adjuncts to facilitate the acceptance of au­
thority. They are important because mastery of a subject "quickly earns 
the respect, trust and esteem of his pupils, and at the same time, their 
obedience and co-operation."(32) The view of authority in CNE considers 
the authority to bo an export, an authc ity as well as the bearer of 
power, the person charged with controlling pupils. There is no differen­
tiation between these two notions. Winch (33) agrees that, to some ex­
tent, the person in authority must have some special attributes that, makes 
lliu pmeuit a«i authority too, but he does describe the difference Peter* 
(34) explains the difference by delegating the one as being "in" authority 
and the other as being "an" authority. Being "an" authority means that 
a person has a greater knowledge and has a "right" to "pronounce 
on ..matters because of... special competence, training or insight."(35) 
Being "in" authority implies having the right to lay down what is correct 
in general, to apply rules to particular cases or to enforce them. When 
there is an appeal to a special person as a source, originator, inter­
preter, or enforcer of rules, the term authority la properly used.(36)
Being "in" authority must not be confused with power, and the distinction 
between the two will be discussed later. "Authority" involves ♦ho appeal 
to an impersonal set of rules or system, and operates because of an ac-
ceptanco of the rules. Thorn must be an "agreement to go the same 
way."(37) "Authority" assumes that there Is a right and wrong way of 
doing something and the right way has to bo determined according to the 
rules. Being In authority means that "the practises and pronouncements 
of a certain group shall be authoritative in connexion with the activity 
in question." Commenting on Peters's distinction, Winch fotls that a 
person in authority is always an authority on something, though being in 
authority meann that the person is an authority on the ruler, of an ac­
tivity in which the person has an entitlement to authority, peturs indi­
cates that one may or may not have any formal authority in a subject but 
may know it well enough so that one's views on the subject command a 
measure of respect. But both Peters and Winch are emphatic that authority 
is clearly different from the exercise of power. CNE and FP, though, quite 
often do sen authority as power.
A u th o rity  and Power
CNE and FP describe authority in such a way that i; includes the exercise 
of power. Authority exacts obedience, a:<d authority, as power, is limited 
by certain criteria, particularly the criteria of norms and philosophy 
of life. The use of compulsion is regarded as being Justified and cor­
rect .
CNE believes that "all authority in school is authority borrowed from 
God."(Article 7:1> This precludes any questioning of authority. The ar­
ticle also defines "discipline" as "all the inner and outer actions and 
influences which work together in order to assure that the behaviour on 
the part of everybody in the school whic.i shall make the aim of teaching 
and educating the most effective." Article 8(2) of the Boleid describes
the three places in which the Afrikaans nation is bred; the home, the 
school and the church and states that each must get "his rightful share 
in the forming of the child."
The spirit and direction of the school is to be decided in collaboration 
"by the parents, the state and the church."Article 8(4). The state must 
supervise the teaching to ensure it io of a "good scientific standard" 
It also has the authority to determine the standard and regulate the 
maintenance vl lew in the school. Although the school is nominally in­
dependent, this independence is permissible only within the limits pre­
scribed, a "freedom under authority", the authority being the parents, 
the state and the church. There is a hierarchy of authority" which re­
quires obedience - pupils have to obey teachers who in turn have to submit 
to the "proper authorities". In FP too, authority is assumed to be the 
exorcise of power, it is seen as a matter of control. The contiol by au­
thorities is essential because of the innate nature of the child. As 
mentioned earlier, the child is one who requires information as to who
he is and to what he is proceeding. He *oas not automatically follow the
correct course must be guided, and if necessary, compelled to change hin 
present course and follow the correct course...Compulsion is therefore 
pedagogically justified."(39) There is an assumption here that the child
cannot be *,ight, that education is not a process during which both the
child and the teacher may be able to learn. Submission appears to te 
crucial. "An educator who knows and trusts an educand expects the latter 
to obey rules, tv» comply w'th commands, to surrender himself to his will 
actively, that is nr. rust have respect for the authority of the educator." 
(40) It has to he clear that the teacher lias the power, the "authority," 
and is under an obligation to exercise this power. It "is the duty of the
educator not to hesitate and to allow himself to be ordered, but must do 
the ordering."(41)
This view of "authoril " seems to be stated as a "scientific fact," and 
there is harsh criticism of those who do not see It in the same light. 
"There is clear evidence that the present youth revolution is an irra­
tional and intuitive revolt against a society which no longer regards the 
duty to supply protective authority as a meaningful obligation."(42) In 
these views there is an assumption that the child cannot be t ight, that 
education is not a process during which ho:h the teacher and the child 
may learn, but as Winch (43) points out, "to submit to authority (as op­
posed to being subjected to power) is not to bo the subject of an alien 
will." What is described in CNE and KP is a form of authoritarianism, 
which advocates and Justifies orders which are backed by inducements or 
by threats of punishment.. in auihoi ilarian L:;m, authority becomes its own 
Justification and practices are not open to question or debate. There is 
no consultation, authority is vested by God in CNE and by "science" In 
FP. In both these theories, there appears to bo no framework for consen­
sus, and the problem is serious because authoritarianism would appear to 
be the antithesis of education Education, for pupils, is very much a 
process of storage, a "banking process", which regards teachers as 
depositors or messengers. Given this view, education becomes uncreative 
mimesis. The authoritarianism of CNE and FP makes them place an undue 
emphasis on what they describe as "discipline".
A u th o rity  and D iscipline
CNE considers "discipline" to moan chastisement, punishment or teaching: 
it implies guidance or ed u catio n, the maintenance of order and punishment
for wrongdoing.(44) Discipline is necessary because though a person may 
desire to do good, often wrong is done instead. Discipline becomes more 
than punishment or instruction, it is "subjection to observance of the 
requirements of propriety."(45) Discipline is of two types, from within 
and from without. Discipline from without is regarded as imposed disci­
pline or discipline applied to groups which the individual may not apply 
in his own life. Discipline from within is self-discipline, and "amounts 
to observing inwardly the requirements of propriety, according to values 
in order of preference" and implies "obedience to the authority of one’s 
philosophy."(46) In FP, the notion of "discipline" is not regarded as 
being problematic, "...discipline (chat is the pedagogic exercise of au­
thority) is the second most important means of education... Exercise of 
educational authority in order that the child ma ru the goal of his
education is discipline, in this case pedagogic tisciplino."(47) In this 
view, "discipline" is an inextricable : of authority. Authority in 
fact, in its application in the early age of the child, depends on "dis­
cipline", seen as punishment.
Moral philosophy has found the morality of compulsion a perplexing ques­
tion. Wilson(49) feels that the morality of compelling children to go 
to school derives from the morality of schooling itse't. The compulsion 
is a moral compulsion and it is a "moral judgement that school is a place 
where pupils and teachers 'should1 go." Wilson is committed to the sort 
of conclusion reached by Hare "... my decision must ultimately rest on 
my preparedness in practice to be bound by that decision; to act on it, 
to suffer the consequences of it and, in short, to try and live by it." 
This is the discipline which lies in any moral decision. Discipline arises 
from the "moral compulsion implicit in their c ;n interests in the school 
activities themselves." The compulsion becomes a matter of pursuing in­
terests in a disciplined way. If the child is compelled without the 
child's interest being taken into account or developed, then the 
compulsion is manipulative, the child becomes better schooled, not better 
disciplined. To pursue an interest is to do what is appropriate to that 
interest, and to submit to the discipline of trying to understand what 
is appropriate to that interest. This understanding may require arduous 
effort, and one may need assistance. This assistance and instruction 
should be related to teaching. For teaching to take place, order is nec­
essary , but in discipline that order is achieved by the values intrinsic 
to the activity itself. When there is "control", the order is imposed. 
Discipline is educative order, and trying to reach appropriate rules when 
engaged in a valued activity. Discipline does not involve regulation. 
There can be no discipline over others, what one has is control. The 
"infant cannot be expected to recognise authority of his own free will. 
He does so from motives of fear (of punishment)."(48).
The term "discipline" is used frequently in both CNE and ff in relation 
to authority. Yet the term is assigned many meanings. Authority is quite 
often seen as an imposition of adult will. "Discipline" is an exercise 
of power and no attempt is made to distinguish it from "punishment". It 
is a form of behavioural control , and this control is exercised through 
fear and hope. Witson(49) sees discipline as different from control. 
Control through "discipline" involves compulsion and is directed by val­
ues outside, the activity itself. Discipline is seen by Wilson as an 
internal relationship; in a disciplined relationship a person submits "to 
the educative order of the task in hand." Discipline is within one'sself 
and there is no discipline over or upon another. "External discipline" 
is a contradiction in terms. Peters (50) shows a clear line between 
"discipline" and "punishment". Punishment may be a way of preserving order
but is not to be confused with discipline. Discipline is "rooted in the 
learning situation."(51) and conveys the notions of submission to rules. 
"Discipline" is a very general notion, unlike "punishment" which is more 
specific, and is appropriate when there is a breach of rules, involving 
the infliction of pain or some unpleasantness, usually by a person in a 
position of power, who has some right to inflict punishment. Punishment 
can be retributive. Punishment is not the same as external discipline, 
and Peters,(52) differing from Wilson, regards external discipline as 
including command or instruction, but not intentional infliction of pain.
There is some link between "discipline" and "authority" but the important 
link is the relation of obedience to rules, and to voluntary submission 
to the demands of the activity or the subject. CNE and FP emphasise dis­
cipline as a means of behaviour modification, which is a form of control. 
Both also regard "discipline" as punishment. The link between authority 
and discipline ssrves to focus on the fact that CNE and FP confuse au 
thority with the relations and exercises of "power", and this idea is 
further demonstrated by the ideas in CNF. and FP about the notion of 
"freedom".
A u th o rity  and Freedom
In CNE, there is a somewhat startling notion of freedom. A person is free 
only when "he is held back by something which protects and compels him 
to use his freedom within limits."(53) It considers freedom without au­
thority, that is freedom without external restrictions, as not being 
freedom but pretence. Ideas of freedom that do not also require obedience 
are soon as harmful "Such 1frcadorns1 load to self righteousness, 
wilfulness and lawlessness."(54) Freedom in CNE is always subject to the
authority of God and a constantly repeated refrain is that freedom implies 
responsibility. There are also some statements that are questionable. 
"All philosophies of life agree that complete freedom does not exist."(55) 
Sartre for one. would disagree. He insists that freedom is inescapable. 
A human being is "compelled tu bo free."(56) Fieedom can be masked but 
not destroyed, a person can never cease to be free.
In CNF., a child has to bo led to freedom, but this freedom is always 
"responsible freedom" and to be allowed this freedom, the child has to 
show he has learnt obedience. Freedom is dependant on obedience. If obe­
dience han not been learnt, no freedom can be allowed as decisions and 
actions might not be desirable and "responsible". CNF. requires that edu­
cation should mould a child's character in a way that "while heeding 
conscience, he will practise the virtues of obedience."(57) This emphasis 
on obedience is constantly ro-iterated. "Man is fre» only when he feels 
bound to something...absolute freedom conflicts with man's very 
nature...To prepare for...freedom the child should receive practise in 
obedience."(58)
FP repeats the idea of the link between responsibility and freedom. It 
has no difficulty about any conflict between the demands of freedom and 
authority, as those are not seen as being opposed or mutually exclusive. 
"Authority and freedom are not antithetical but polar co-ordinates."(59) 
Freedom can be negative or positive. It is negative when it is "freedom 
from" and is seen as truly positive when "directed towards observance of 
standard**, obedience and responsibility."(60) Freedom means acting 
responsibly, and acting responsibly becomes "equated with acting in ac­
cordance with set norms and standards."(61) in FP, it seems, freedom can
only be attained by submission. "True" freedom always means obedience to 
authority and subservience to norms.
Freedom and authority, the extent and nature of human freedom and its 
limitations, has long been a subject of philosophical consideration 
Though Sartre insists on complete freedom, generally philosophers accept 
some limitations arc necessary.(62) Kant's categorical imperative places 
some.restriction on freedom. Human beings should be treated, never solely 
as means, but always as an end. Tills limits our freedom and untramme.,ed 
action is not permissible, but the limitation is introduced to advance
freedom, to ensure that one will is not subjected to another, 
utilitarianism of Mill also suggests something similar, a view of moral 
rules as generalised imperatives with a stress on their reciprocal qual 
ity. R. S. Peters describes the "paradox of freedom."(63) Some re­
striction, such as the rule of law is necessary to ensure that freedom 
is not subverted, and the weaker is not compelled to submit to the arbi­
trary will of the stronger. Though there is some limitation of fiwwdom 
in all these views, there is a crucial difference. In other views, the
limitations are introduced to ensure protection for the weaker, and not,
as in FP, to ensure that there is obedience to the "proper authorities". 
In CNE and FP, the term "freedom" is a misnomer. Authority is related 
to freedom, not a balance of freedom set against mutually agreed rules,
but to freedom as obedience, and subservience to authority. FP wants ev
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eryone to acknowledge the "proper" authority and be obedient to it.
Obedience means For both the educator and educand...the acknowledgement 
of human (anthropic) values as educational values."(64) Theoretically the 
obedience is due to God or to norms, but in practice, obedience becomes 
due to whoever is being regarded in authority, as the arbiter of the
correct norms and values, and this, though the parents and the church are
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presumed to hflvo an vqual authority, ultImatoly is the state. "Freedom" 
in GNE and FP, with this stress on obedience, becomes the antithesis of 
freedom, and becomes an authoritarian view of education, and not a paradox 
for the purpose of ensuring freedom as it is in Peters s view
FP claims to be "scientific", a. I r.s part of its "scientific" status, has 
created a particular use of terminology. The pndagoglcian is required 
to define clearly "certain terms used in everyday language with all kinds 
of confusing connotations. This is an important prerequisite for the 
practising of authentic science."(65) In pursuit of those scientific 
terms, pedagogics draws distinctions between words such as "education", 
which is "the practice, the educator1 s .. .concern in assisting the child 
on his way to adulthood" and "Pedagogics" which is "the science practised 
by the educationist". There is differentiation between "education" and 
"pedagogics", between "educator" and "pedagogician", "pedagogics" end 
"pedagogy". Unfortunately, in its own practice, FP is not so precise 
about defining terms and explaining its notions. V. Morrow(bh) states that 
there often is conflation of meaning, such as that between "philosophy 
of life" and "culture" or "philosophy of education" and "schooling pol­
icy". While CNE and FP can give their own interpretation to terms cr 
invest them with any meanings desired by them, this la contrary to FP's 
"scientific" aspirations. FP would want terms, as "scientific" termi­
nology, to be precise and universally valid. This does not quite apply 
in FP's use of the term "authority", which is a complex notion. Assigning 
only one meaning is to ignore the complexities of the term.
However, this limited use ol "authority" adopted by GNE and FP is indic­
ative of the underlying purpose, conscious or unconscious, of turn impor­
tance assigned to it. Wittgcnstoln(67) doncribed the use of language as
part of a language game, and a language game is a specific activity car­
ried on with language. "The restricted forms of language games serve to 
isolate and highlight the different roles that linguistic expression can 
play and the purposes for which they may be used." Language is a form of 
life, particularly of social life, and a particular use of language shows
a particular set of social practices.
By using one meaning of "authority", CNF and FP show a particular set of
thought and practice, By regarding it as the exezuise of power anti con­
trol, and submission to "authority" as being obedience, there is an 
elimination of the space that would allow for autonomy and critical 
thought. It prevents the questioning of underlying assumptions. This 
moans that social and political relations that arc to be reproduced remain 
covered. In the next section I want to examine the notion that "author­
ity" has boon emphasised in a particular wav because it serves to further 
certain political and economic interests.
THE P O LIT IC S  OF " A U T H O R IT Y "  IN SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATIO N
8. Bornatfiin states that "How a society selects, classifies, 
distributes.transmits and evaluates the educational knowledge It consid­
ers to be public reflects both the distribution of power and the princi­
ples of social control. (1)
Both CNF. and FP see authority as an Inescapable part of their educational 
theories. While these theories regard "authority" as means of attaining 
"educational" objectives, the educational theories also serve economic 
and political interests. CNE purports to serve primarily religious be­
liefs, and emphasises its theistic foundations, based on Calvinism. Its 
religious foundations are openly declared, and it would be unfair to 
criticise it for being based on religious foundations. But although it 
claims to be "a policy for the Afrikaans Calvinistic section of our pop­
ulation" and "was never intended for the English Anglican soction, neither 
for any other Afrikaans religious or philosophical group"(2), it was, in 
practice, a theory on which all South African education was baaed and its 
values wore imposed on all. Its theistic basis also concealed political
mand economic interests. To enforce its views, and to encourage acceptance 
of them, "authority" was a crucial device. To reduce resistance and 
questioning of educational practice, "authority" was constantly stressed. 
According to CNE "Cosmology"(3), God's plan is unknown to man. "God's 
being is something that sinful man should not ask and cannot know." Sub­
mission t *. authority is what is required and questioning is undesirable. 
"Absolute truth goes beyond man's Intellect." As truth is beyond human 
comprehension, obedience to authority is essential. This authority be­
longs not only to God, but has devolved on those placed in political au­
thority. "...he will practise the virtues of obedience by realising it 
is necessary to obey the laws of the land...Not only should the child obey 
the law but ho should uphold it...It should be Impressed on the child that 
ru*.stance to authority...always brings retribution in the shape of pun­
ishment." This clearly indicates that educational "authority" is ex­
tended to indicate obedience to those in political power, and thus is used 
to enforce political aims. The obedience required is obedience to the .aw 
and yet, in writing that claims to be philosophical, there is no sug­
gestion of any questioning of the Justice or rightness of the law or the 
political power that the child is trained to obey
Only those who have learnt to obey authority, those who have accepted the 
"proper" values, are deemed to be worthy of gaining any positions. If one 
obeys the "proper" authority, one learns to lead, "Leadership qualities 
should be developed by teaching the child that an able leader must have 
been a loyal follower."(4) But obedience is not limited to the child. The 
teacher, in <i different way, has to be obedient as well. The "correct 
attitude" is required, and the teacher has to carry out instructions 
faithfully, even though he might not agree with them. Once the in­
structions have been obeyed, he should "lodge his objection through the 
right channels."(5) Tills objection is, of course, limited to the detail 
of correctness of the order only and implies an acceptance of the values 
and the hierarchy and this legitimises the authority. The main framework 
does not remain open to question. In any kind of mechanical or military 
activity, this kind of rigid insistence on ober.lrnce could perhaps be 
justifiable, but In the development of intellect, it is out of place. CNE 
and IP do not regard "truth" as something to be explored. It has already 
been given, and is to be found within the keeping of those in authority.
The child has to take "realities" for granted and the "facts" are to be 
considered as independent, not as the the construction of interests, "not 
as constructed realities realised in particular institutional 
contexts"(6) or of truth as, according to C.W.Mills being, in its per­
sistence and change, "open to socio-historical relativization."(7) In CNb 
(and FP) the legitimacy of authority is never in question. It is always 
assumed to be legitimate "...the legitimacy of 'study objects' becomes 
built into categories of thought themselves."(A)
The accentuation of obedience serves to ensure conformity within the group 
as well. Orders have to be carried out and the welfare of the group takes 
precedence over individual development. In CNF., the group, the "national" 
has become represented by the state, and the state has been legitimised 
by God. The power of the state is regarded as the "authority" of the 
state, and this "authority" must be exercised to perpetuate these puwuis 
of the state. "We believe that the autho.ilies must see to it that the 
education which is given to adults is not damaging to the state."(Article 
IS)
The idea of "authority" as an exercise of power to maintain interests
is particularly evident in Articles 14 and 15 which deal with the educa­
tion of the "Coloured" and the "Bantu". Article 14 states: "We believe 
Coloured teaching must be seen as a subordinate part of the vocation and 
task of the Afrikaner to Christianise the non-white races.. We accept the 
principle of trusteeship...of the Afrikaner over the non-white. Wo be­
lieve that only when the colour'd man has been Christianised can he and 
will he be secure against Ills own heathen and all kinds of foreign ide­
ologic* which promise him a sham happiness but in the long run make him 
unsatisfied and unhappy." The values of CNE are to be forced on to others.
and in imposing thesn values, the "coloured" does not have to consent. 
The "coloured" is regarded as a child, and if the coloured finds happiness 
in any other belief, this belief is childish or even worse, a "sham" 
happiness. The basis of Judging tho authenticity of happiness seems to
be with whoever CNE regards to be the authority.
Article 15 has similar views about "black" education and it also wants 
the "teaching and the education of the native" to be "grounded in the life 
and world view of the whites, most especially those of the Boer nation. .. 
On the grounds of cultural infancy of the native we believe it is the 
right and task of tho state in collaboration with the Christian Protestant 
churches to glvo and control native education."
There is not even a pretence of tolerance, or a consideration that the 
beliefs of "colourois" might have any value or that they have a right to 
create their own understanding of life. The "1 fe and world view" that 
others must accept must be "especially those of the Boer nation." Other 
cultures are infe.tor or immature, and the mature can have domination over 
them. As the adult has power over the child, the child has to be obedient 
and accept the control of "authority". The term "trusteeship" implies a 
relationship of guardianship, of directing and loading, usually for the 
benefit of the ward But there is a crucial contradiction in regarding 
black people as wards. Tho ward usually comes of age and becomes inde­
pendent of the trustee, but in CNE1 s view of "trusteeship" the ward always 
remains a minor, subject to the control of the trustee. There is no coming 
of age, no reaching of equality, the trusteeship is designed not for the 
benefit of the ward but of the trustee. The Belaid emphasises "no equality 
and segregation" and trusteeship is based on colour and not mental or
physical attributes. {'.quality of culture, mid conseqiontly of treatment 
or opportunity con never be possible in CNF.. A kind of condescending 
kindness is encouraged, but with an understanding that there is a clear 
division. "Positive social attitudes should be developed...but...all 
people can never be equal in the full sense of the word because of pro­
found differences in culture, clvilizational mnturit), background, level 
of education, fair treatment of lews developed races and cultures should 
never degenerate into nogrophtle fraternization with mentally immature 
groups with a lower level of culture."(9) The separate education acts for 
the different race groups and the educational legislation of the National 
Party in the decade of the 1960's, and In particular the National Advisory 
Education Council Act all appear to show the Influence of CNE thought. 
In the separate education acts "authority" was important to ensure that 
the "authority" would remain in control. For exampli, the Indians Educa­
tion Act, Act no 61 of 1965, spells out in considerable detail ‘he pro­
cedure for ‘he Ms<
misconduct 
(e) to (r) are
icharge of a teacher particularly on account of 
iuct is defined in Section 16 and definitions from 
in relation to "authority", Section 16(c) states
that a teacher .. mils misconduct if he disobeys, disregards or makes 
wilful default in carrying out a lawful order given to him by a person 
having authority to give it, or by word or conduct displays insubordi­
nation. The other acts relating to "Coloured" and "Bantu" have generally 
similar provisions. The definition is so broad that any dissent can be 
construed as misconduct even if this dissent merely questions the rea- 
sonablenesj ot the order, or a gesture expresses disagreement. Any 
"lawful" order has to be carried out, mid by "lawful1' is meant anything 
permitted by law. It need not he of any educational value. Nor are those 
conditions mere legal conveniences. There have been teachers charged with 
misconduct for disobedience to "authority" in school. There is the ex­
ample of a teacher who was charged with insubordination for refusing the 
"lawful order" to "forecast" his lessons.(10) At the subsequent enquiry 
the presiding officer commented that the teacher was efficient and not 
lax or "insubordinate" but had to be found guilty as he had not carried 
out a lawful order. The idea of obedience was crucial, and all other 
considerations were irrelevant if the order was "lawful".
The implication in the education act seemed to be that 'authority" exacted 
obedience, and this notion meant that "authority" could be used to uuutrol 
teachers. Morality or justice did not appear to have great importance. 
At a particular school, a memorandum was submitted to the education de­
partment concerned accusing the principal of financial irregularities. 
The department conceded that the complaints wore not baseless, but in a 
letter(ll) informed the teachers that "the spirit of antagonism towards 
management staff as revealed by your memorandum cannot but be detrimental 
to the discipline and general well-being of the school ..You would do well 
to adopt a more professionally sound attitude and to accord the principal 
your full co-operation."
In most South African schooling, "auth >rity" is control. There is a hi­
erarchy of authority, and obedience is always required. In the example 
cited, "authority" is not a question of an arbiter of rules, but a form 
of power and control, particularly control of teachers. The reason for 
the exercise of control is rooted in the system of education prevalent 
in South Africa. The system has been examined from many viewpoints, and 
there is general agreement with the view that the Nationalists attempted 
to implement a form of education intended to produce "inferior, non­
threatening and tribal 1stic Africans."(12) The kind of race division in 
South Africa has been, quite often, linked to its economic system. There
are both Marxists and liberals who argue that if elaborate rhetoric is 
stripped away, "apartheid" is simply a harsh class system.(13) Marxists 
have, in attempting to reconcile class and colour differentiation, re­
garded colour as being only a visible manifestation of class, the whites 
representing the capitalists and bourgeoisie, and the blacks the 
proletariat. There are difficulties about this analysis, however, and 
warnings about implying an economic reductionism(14). Though capital is 
regarded as a social relation, and ideological and political structures 
are part of the accumulation process and of labour reproduction, this 
should not be detsrministically assumed. Many contradictions and con­
flicts are involved and the analysis is quite problematic.
In the initial years of National Party rule, the idea of domination by 
race was quite explicit. Whites wore regarded as superior and laws were 
unapologetically racist . Political and economic developments, which can­
not bs examined in detail in this essay, led to more refined and subtler 
forms of domination. The transition from CNF. has been linked to these 
developments, but again too simplistic a view must not be taken. FP as a 
theory preceded many of the developments it has been linked with such as 
the Wichan and de Lange reports. These reports brought about a change from 
the explicit racism which existed previously. In the same way, racism was 
explicit in CNF, but not in FP. Bearing those reservations in mind, South 
Africa's political and economic relations have undeniably undergone some 
restructuring. There is disagreem mt about the extent and nature of the 
process and care must be taken not to read into it a conspiracy theory 
or a deliberate design. Motives are often not conscious and processes are 
confused and contradictory. But some developments clearly contributed to 
change. International hostility and black resistance were among these, 
as were economic imperatives. The situation of white labour had also
changed. High unemployment had given way to a shortage of white labour. 
Labour requirements had changed from requiring a pool of unskilled labour 
to requiring semi-skilled operatives and technicians. Technological ad­
vancement and monopolistic capitalism led to capital intensive companies, 
white farms also became larger and more mechanised. Social order and so­
cial requirements also changed. In education, these pressures required 
that the stress shift to "technicism".
P Buck land (15) describes the ideological shifts in the ruling elite to 
accommodate changes in the social structure and the emergence of business 
and the military as power factors. Buck land feels that in spite of an 
ideological affiliation to Christian National Education there was an 
"infusion into the education bureaucracy and into education of 
technocratic ideals." The HSRC investigation under de Lange was an ex­
pression of this technicism. The values of CNF. were retained, but tech­
nological efficiency was stressed. The technicist values of efficiency 
and control implicit in "scientific" research, "scientific" management 
and "differentiated education" provides a legitimising basis. FP also 
serves this legitimising process. It also wraps education in a rhetoric 
of science that promotes technicist values. Apple(16) argues that systems 
techniques are systems of control. In FP, the scientism legitimates the 
existing distribution of control and power. Part of the implementation 
of this technicism required strong control over teachers and the notion 
of "authority" in FP serves to implement this control, a control wrapped 
in the rhetoric of "science".
FP putr. forward the idea of a neutral, value-free "science" of education 
but as Kallaway(17) puts it, FP dresses "up the blatant political chau­
vinist and racist nature of earlier educational doctrine" and has found
"a language and a structure that would allow the appearance that the 
study of things educational had been taken out of the market place of 
ideas - of economic pressures, political conflict and ideological 
contestation."
There is in FP the assumption that because education is a science, it does 
not, in its scientific stage, represent any interest at all. But this 
representation ignores the fact that concepts cannot be viewnd in iso­
lation, that it is their context which gives them significance and their 
use represents a particular cast of thought and frame of understanding. 
Concepts are embedded in theoretical and political contexts, 
"legitimisatlon of social order is...symbolic, and more importantly, 
hidden."(18) An adaptation of Bourdieu's ideas might bo appropriate to 
give some clarity to claims of "scientific" neutrality. Bturdieu (19) 
describes how meanings are reproduced, and certain cultural forms are 
legitimated. The relations of power impose certain meanings and catego­
ries. By describing FP as "scientific", its description and concepts are
given status, and its meanings are defined as "rational". The relations 
of power arc concealed, education is assumed to be "scientifically" neu­
tral, and its values are not open to question. Ignored is the (act that 
imposing categories of meaning on the dominated group represents symbolic 
violence. The supposedly neutral methodology of FP presents the social 
sciences or education as apolitical(20). Giroux suggests that we should 
analyse the assumptions embedded in a given educational paradigm. What 
interests do these assumptions serve? What are the material and intel­
lectual forces that sustain those assumptiona?(21)
The notion of FP as a science tries to give a status to the "authority" 
of experts. Education acquires a paraphernalia of "scientific" accesso-
I'
rjes such as I.Q. testing, psychometric tests, "taxonomies". These exert 
control over and affect children in many ways, and questioning is avoided 
because what is done is done by "scientific authority". In KP.the schoolH I  H 11
is represented as impersonal. "Pedagogics in the science of the education 
situation which will reveal the pedagogic phenomenon In its essential 
structures."(22) This view of the "scientific" professed by KP treats as 
unproblematic the question of how pupils, teachers and knowledge are 
organised and how some are in a position to impose meanings on uLhei». (23)
■
Apple (24) regards schools as institutions interconnected with political 
and other institutions, and schools often unquestionably act to distrib­
ute knowledge and values through both the overt and the hidden curriculum. 
Though FP implies that authority represent"d in the schools is "scien­
tifically" based, it ignores that the school is a vehicle through which 
those with economic and political power shape public policy "(25) When 
the norms of society control the kind of "authority", the educator is 
reduced to being an expert of method only, r# roved from the purpose and 
nature of education.
B. Parker (26) says that in FP the child has to submit to the authority 
of the teacher and the teacher to a set of norms laid down by the higher 
baing. The individual must submit to the authority of the State which 
represents i higher being. For the Individual to act freely, tho indi- 
vidua 1 must act in accordance with the laws of the state. The stress on
obedience makes education a nrocess of submission.
The cruder policy of CNE could not gain acceptance, but the refinement 
of the ideas as presented in FP show "authority" tis a "scientific" part
of education, and made acceptance much easier.
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Althusser s account (27) of ideological state apparatuses, while not
without difficulties, gives an idea of the role of education in re­
producing social formations. This reproduction requires not only a re­
production of skills but also a submission to the ruies of the established
order. If the idea of submission is learnt, there is no need to use re­
pressive appuiatuses
If children in school absorb the practice of obedience, they regard as 
natural the hierarchy of authority, and it becomes easier to reproduce 
social formations that perpetuate domination. But "authority" need net 
be used only for purposes of domination. In the next section I shall 
out lino,briefly, a notion of "authority" that could serve to promote the
worth of the individual.
SECTION FIVE
SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS MORE EQUITABLE  
" A U T H O R IT Y "  IN SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATIO N
PRINCIPLES OF
I tie euggeet lone in thin Beet ion ta'.e bb a central idua tlie wui Lli ui tho 
individual.(1) The concern with the worth of the individual means that 
all are allowed to live "autonomous... 1ives."(2) I want to suggest prin­
ciples of "authority" that would allow each person freedom and autonomy 
and not make one person subject to another's will.
What one considers worthwhile in life will determine one's view of edu­
cation. Education is inseparably linked to one's conception of the good I 
life. My view of the good life is based on the worth of the individual. 
the view that the individual is autonomous and entitled to docide on her 
own conception of the good life.
CNE and FI* propose something different from this view. CNE envisages an 
education that aosorts that it is designed to promote the religious views
of Calvinist Afrikaners.(3) FI', while aspiring to be a "scientific" stt 
ui education and claiming to be neutral, is closely linked to CNE and has 
a similar vision of the good life. It also allows for a "post-scientific" 
education based on a particular "philosophy of life."(4) I shall ignore 
here tho peculiar use of the term "philosophy". FP accepts that in South 
Africa, education must bo based on CNE. According to Act 3S of 1967, all 
teachers in South Africa "must subscribe to n Christ ian National v*6W of 
life."(5) The form of the good life determined by these theories leaves
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no room for Individual autonomy. There is an emphasis on a particular form 
of "authority" as control to ensure that the individual dons not develop 
a different idea of the good life. "Authority" exacts conformity with a 
set of norms that are assumed to be correct. In presenting an alternative 
set of principles of authority, I assume that the ordinary person can make 
her own decisions. There are "no moral experts on tl.a good life for in­
dividuals in detail."(6) No conception of the goo life can be arbitrarily 
Imposed on anyone, and no one nhuuld be subject to an arbitrary view. The 
only person to decide is the individual himself.
This docs not imply an unrestricted freedom, because there are always the 
limitations imposed by others1 right to freedom as well. It one person 
is allowed unrestricted freedom, another person s freedom may bo limited. 
A sacrifice of some freedom is necessary, though this limitation is per­
missible only to secure freedom. It in very important that any sacrifice 
be seen as a sacrifice, and not, as FP sometimes seems to see it, as an 
enlargement of freedom for those who have to make the sacrifice. But even
all,wing for this sacrifice, it is imperative that there remain a certain 
minimum area of personal freedom, allowing one to follow what one holds 
good or right or sacred.(7) To ensure that one person's freedom does not 
encroach on another a, something external has to set limits, and thit. can 
usually be done by rules which define the limits to which freedom may be 
restrained without affecting the minimum area of freedom that an Indi­
vidual must have.
It becomes necessary for every individual to have a share in the exercise 
or control of power. This means that each person is to have an equal 
share in th' exercise or control of power so that no c nteption of the 
good life is arbitrarily imposed on anyone, and no one is subject to ar«
bitrary Interference."(8) The Individual should bo allowed access 13 
power at every level, and every institution should allow participation. 
One way of allowing Individuals access to this power would be the intro­
duction of a form of participatory democracy such as suggested by P. 
White.(9) She details the form of participation by the individual in 
different areas of life, but I do not intend to spell out the details of 
the participation here. She also suggests that training for participation 
in democratic activity can best bn done at school.
It is generally accepted that a child must not only be instructed to view 
a particular form of life as the good life, but needs to learn it by ex­
perience and participation. For example, CNK insists that a "Christian 
character can bu lu formed only in a Christian milieu" and that, the 
"spirit, the tendency, the instruction and all the activities of the 
school" should "revs*1 the Christian philosophy of life when the Bible 
is accepted in education as the objective and the normative in its widest 
embrace."(10) FP also feels that there is, cut lously in view of its 
"scientific" aspirations, "no t»uch thing as a neutral education "(11) It 
is at school, then, that children can learn to respect the worth of oth­
ers, and education can ass .t in creating an attitude of cone rn for 
others. Children at school can learn •'♦'out participation in the 
decision-making process, not only by being told about it, but by a prac­
tical involvement. It is "very important not to underestimate the 
educative influence of a well-run, democratically organized school."(12) 
Children tend to develop attitudes towards structures which control their 
lives, and by their participation in dec!.ion making, they can learn to 
be critical, tolerant of othei viewpoints and willing to accept having 
their mistakes pointed out to them, and he prepared to rectify these
■ .. .
Schools cnn be part of a process to provide "guided experience in 
decislon-making"( 14) because It is "the school par excellence which can 
provide such carefully guided practise in participation in decision­
making if it boo] organisation with that in mind.”(15) In
learning decision-making children can also learn rules and orocedure, and
„
to consider the worth ot the individual. Iliey can also leem that au 
thjrity" does not mean unquestioning obedience to power structures, that 
"authority" does not have to mean control. Decision-making would also 
develop the idea of a moral responsibility and there could be an mcoui- 
agomnnt for a "concern to do what is right in the context of the whole 
community."(16) If there is this concern, children will begin to realise 
that decision-making will impose certain limits on freedom.
The idea of limitation should distinguish between these types ol freedom 
- freedom of thought, freedom of expression and freedom of action.(17) 
In education there could be no Justification for restricting freedom o 
thought. Freedom of expression requires limitation only to the extent that 
another person's freedom is not interfered with, and it is :i.it harmful 
to anyone. There are some difficulties about freedom of action, and re­
straint is often needed as unrestricted freedom can harm the freedom of
others. The strong can impo* ill! on the weak, and unrestricted
freedom can also become a device for maintaining existing inequalities.
FP suggests that fieedom is obtained by complete submission to authority 
but in my suggestions the individual is required tu submit to control on I 
to the extent that greater freedom to all is available. But any freedt 
should be reduced only when absolutely necessary. The "onus is on anyoi
who wants to interfere with another's freedom to Justify the
interference."'(18) The frontier between personal freedom and public con­
trol is a shifting line that has to he constantly renegotiated.(19) One 
of the ways in which it can ho ensured that there can bn i.omn balance is 
to have a system of rules by which all must nbido. The ru’es are essential 
to see that the individual's freedom remains. Thu rules can obviously not 
be perfect but there has to On a system of rules. Rules are a necessary 
part of the projection of individual freedom. They set out limits and are 
intended to create a system that allows the person to follow what she
considers the good life.
Peters(20) distinguishes clearly between "power" and "authority". Au 
thorlty is linked to a rule-governed way of life and is necessary to bring 
out '.he wayn in which behaviour is regulated without recourse to power, 
to force, incentives and propaganda. The "authority" of rules of Justice 
would ensure that, if it becomes necessary to limit or control freedom, 
it could be done according to the principles of fairness and just ice. The 
crucial difference here is that FI’ and t’NK see "authority" as power and 
control. Peters(7.1) argues that "authority" is properly used only in those 
situations in which decisions about what is correct or incorrect are 
reached by appealing to some source or "auctor". With rules, "authority" 
would thus he an appeal to an impersonal set of rules that are formulated 
to a1low the Individual the maximum of freedom compatible with the freedom 
of others.
Individual autonomy can bo undermined in many ways, and one of these is 
too wide a difference in wealth.(22) Marxists argue that Inequality cannot 
be eliminated without public o aershlp of the means of production. But 
Strike(23) argues that the traditional Marxist view does not distinguish
botwcet. ownership of thn moons of production and control of tho moans of 
production. Somo concentration of ecor 1c power can be allowed If there 
are safeguards to make it. compatible with Justice and fairness. If such 
safeguards cannot be designed, then Justice would require a different 
economic order. An egalitarian approach to the distribution of economic 
power would be the ideal, but a range of differences may have to be al­
lowed, If only for motivation purposes. What is important is that each
person must have the right "to the basic minimum to cover needs like food, 
shelter, clothing, medical care, education and so on."(24) The basic 
minimum should not be "assumed to be a low minimum",(25) and should allow 
a person more than mere subsistence.
Though the principle cf the worth of the individual may not address all 
inequalities and injustices, it ha* the intention to correct all. All 
theories have seen society through particular frames of thought, and even 
"progressive" theories have overlooked particular injustices, primarily 
because they were not seen •* Injustices ard no one had thought to ques­
tion them. Many theories have had to be modified. A commitment to the 
worth of the Individual does not seen that there is perfect Justice as 
one might not have buen ew-tre one is committing an injustice, but it does 
encourage open mindudnnes in place 01 dogmatic adherence to previously 
held views end also a readiness to question any new problems that CMy come 
to light
While rules assist in ensuring that thm.e is Individual autonomy, care 
must be taken that this does not lead to an unfeeling, legalistic ap-
: roach. It must also b< | sms mho red that no form of governments can
„
guarantee liberty (26). Rules need to be supplemented by something in 
the nature of P Wnite's notion of "fraternity".(2*, Genuine fraternal
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feelings would not only be ’'brotherly" feelings although these and sororal 
feelings would be included, but also feelings of mutual respect, toler­
ance, and a bond as equals, with all people considereo as moral persons, 
entitled to a life of their own. These feelings of "fraternity" could lead 
to a more egalitarian system of education, a system that would avoid the 
hierarchical structure in schools which requires compliance and sub­
mission. As "authority" should be based on rules that have been accepted 
by consent, the right to interpret what is correct should allow room tor 
questioning and dissent. A democratic structure of education and school­
ing has tc be based on agreement and the participation of pupils, teachers 
and parents, possibly on a pattern suggested by P White.(28) Democratic 
participation would lead to a democratic organisation of education, and 
its contents. as the school has to provida a primary good to which all 
people have a right, it should be democratically constituted. The deter­
mination of rules, and the authori y in the interpretation of these would 
be by democratically constituted groups, subject to the provisions of the 
rules of just:„ .
White suggests a participatory democracy in the organisation of the school 
that could allow for the participation of all involved in the school, and 
who would be party to decisions affecting the school. Children also need 
to develop an understanding of the role of "authority" and "power" in 
regulating their lives, and their participation in decision making could 
be an important part of their development. All participants in the school 
would know the manner of running the institution. Every individual could 
have a share in the control of the organisation.
The essential difference between what is suggested here and "authority" 
in NE and FP is that in the simplest sense, "authority" in (JNE and FP
is a misnomer for control and the exercise of power, while I feel that 
"authority" is a submission to rules framed by consent. Education is, of 
course, not isolated from society, and the manner of the exercise of power 
in education is an extension of the exercise of political power. Any 
changes in the form of educational "authority" would necessarily  require 
changes in all areas of society. There are enormous problems in creating 
a functioning, fully democratic system with egalitarian and just insti­
tutions, but the authoritarianism prevalent in schools is inimical to 
education, and even an impel feet atte.iipt. would constitute a notable lui
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